Architecture and policymaking: comparing experimentalist and hierarchical governance in EU energy regulation by Rangoni, Bernardo
  
Bernardo Rangoni 
Architecture and policymaking: 
comparing experimentalist and 
hierarchical governance in EU energy 
regulation 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Rangoni, Bernardo (2017). Architecture and policymaking: comparing experimentalist and 
hierarchical governance in EU energy regulation. Journal of European Public Policy. ISSN 1350-
1763 
 
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1385644  
 
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85342/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2017 
 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
Architecture and policymaking: comparing experimentalist and 
hierarchical governance in EU energy regulation 
Bernardo Rangoni 
Department of Government, London School of Economics (LSE), London, United 
Kingdom 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article contends that the same set of decision-making procedures can be 
used more or less experimentally or hierarchically, depending on strategic 
uncertainty and de facto polyarchy. It distinguishes architectures from 
policymaking, and offers widely applicable indicators to better distinguish 
more experimentalist or hierarchical institutional designs from how decision-
making actually occurs. It argues that polyarchy can be understood in both de 
jure and de facto terms, and shows that neither is fixed; equally, it proposes an 
alternative operationalisation and shows that strategic uncertainty neither 
consistently rises nor gradually declines, but varies cyclically. It suggests that 
strategic uncertainty and de facto polyarchy might be jointly sufficient for 
experimentalist policymaking. Rather than a linear trend in which hierarchical 
governance re-emerges and experimentalist governance declines, it finds cyclical 
variation. More broadly, it extends claims that functional and political accounts 
are not mutually exclusive from questions of bureaucratic structures to their 
actual operation. 
KEYWORDS EU energy regulation; EU policymaking; experimentalist 
governance; functional explanations; institutional architectures; political 
explanations 
Introduction 
In recent years, an important debate has emerged about the extent to which the creation 
and design of bureaucratic structures in the European Union (EU) has been driven by 
political considerations related to distributional conflict and the influence of 
supranational actors (Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Tarrant and Kelemen 2017), or instead 
primarily by functional needs to fill a ‘regulatory gap’ between EU level rule-making 
competences and national implementation (Blauberger and Rittberger 2015, 2017). 
Meanwhile, an innovative, experimentalist interpretation has attracted considerable 
attention. Stimulated by strategic uncertainty and a polyarchic or multipolar distribution 
of power, a new architecture of experimentalist governance, defined in general terms as 
‘a recursive process of provisional goal-setting and revision based on the comparison of 
alternative approaches to advancing them in different contexts’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 
2012a: 170), has become extensively institutionalised across a broad range of policy 
domains in the EU (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010). However, since institutional 
architectures can be used in many different ways, the actual impact of such 
experimentalist architecture on EU policymaking remains largely unclear (De Burca 
2010; Lavenex 2008; Radaelli 2008; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; Zeitlin 2005).  
This article therefore contributes to experimentalist governance and EU 
policymaking, by examining the important relationship between institutional 
architectures (i.e., the design of decision-making procedures) and policymaking 
processes (i.e., the way such decision-making procedures actually operate to produce 
policy outcomes). It contrasts experimentalist with more traditional hierarchical 
governance, distinguishes between architectures and policymaking, and develops clear 
indicators, derived from experimentalist theory, for categorising these two forms of 
policymaking. Then it uses these indicators to trace and compare the EU regulation of 
electricity and natural gas in the last two decades, by focusing on a critical issue for the 
development of competition in network industries, namely congestion management. 
This is a particularly appropriate case study because the key policymaker, the European 
Commission, operates within the same institutional architecture. Finally, this article 
considers how scope conditions presented in the literature can account for the patterns 
identified. 
This article begins by positioning experimentalist theory within the broader 
literature on public policymaking in the EU, focusing on the expansion of 
experimentalist architecture and identifying the gap regarding its actual operation. 
Thereafter, the analytical framework for studying experimentalist and hierarchical 
policymaking is presented, specifically for distinguishing between these forms of 
policymaking, examining scope conditions, and selecting cases, sources of evidence, 
and methods. Finally, this article considers how institutional architectures are used in 
EU energy regulation and how this can be explained, before drawing wider conclusions.  
The spread of experimentalist architecture in the EU 
Experimentalist governance theory may be positioned in the broader field of EU 
policymaking, and is usually presented as a rival to conventional hierarchical 
governance (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012a). It acknowledges previously identified distinctive 
features of EU policymaking such as deliberation (Joerges and Neyer 1997), 
informalism (Christiansen and Piattoni 2000), and multi-level decision-making (Kohler-
Koch and Eising 1999), but claims that this list of distinctive features ‘crucially 
overlooks the underlying architecture of public rulemaking in the EU […] and the way 
this design transforms the distinct elements of EU governance by connecting them into 
a novel whole’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008: 273). In its most developed form, 
experimentalist architecture involves four key elements linked in an iterative multi-level 
cycle. In this design, first, framework goals are jointly established by member states and 
EU institutions. Lower-level units such as regulatory authorities and regulated 
companies are then given discretion to implement different approaches to the same 
general goals. But, third, they must participate in peer reviews in which their own 
approaches are compared with those of others. Finally, the framework goals are 
periodically revised by a widening circle of actors (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010, 
2012a). 
Jointly fostered by strategic uncertainty and a multipolar or polyarchic distribution of 
power, experimentalist architecture has quickly and consistently found its way, 
especially in the EU. Through fora, networked agencies, councils of regulators, open 
method of coordination (OMC), or more generally processes it has expanded across a 
wide array of policy domains. These include the regulation of competition, energy, 
telecommunications, and finance; food, drugs, chemicals, and maritime safety; 
environmental protection; employment promotion and social inclusion; justice, security, 
and crisis management; and data privacy, anti-discrimination, and fundamental rights 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010).  
However, not only it was argued that there is a tendency for hierarchical 
governance to re-emerge as experimentalist governance reduces strategic uncertainty 
and distributive conflicts reappear (Eberlein 2010). But also, experimentalist 
governance advocates recognize that ‘in the life of society and the law nothing works 
precisely as designed’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008: 280-1). Indeed, by reviewing evidence 
on implementation of the OMC, launched by the Lisbon European Council in 2000 and 
often presented as archetypal example of experimentalist architecture in the EU, some 
have highlighted that, in actuality, significant practical limitations have inhibited the 
realization of the OMC’s theoretical promise (Zeitlin 2005). Others have noted that as 
OMCs have evolved, they have varied considerably in their modalities (Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2008). Still others have suggested that the relationship between these processes 
and policy change might break down at several points (Radaelli 2008). More generally, 
sceptical scholars have warned that, in fact, network governance might not be void of 
hierarchical traits (Lavenex 2008). Likewise, scholars more sympathetic to 
experimentalism have suggested that, ‘systems with all the elements of the new 
governance architecture in place will remain architectures only if they do not also 
operate in an experimentalist way’ (De Burca 2010: 235).  
Hence, most of the literature to date has focused on tracing the emergence and 
diffusion across different contexts of institutional architectures with experimentalist 
design features, with much less attention paid to how such institutional architectures 
work in practice. Such primary focus on institutional structures is common practice, 
because it has obvious practical advantages relative to analyses of policy-level 
behaviour regarding both the generation and use of data. However, it also implies that 
the potential gap between institutional design and actual operation is overlooked. The 
issue is that policymakers can and indeed often favour distinct types of policymaking 
processes by using institutional structures differently. This means that, although the 
novel experimentalist interpretation has been influential in the broader study of EU 
public policymaking, the actual impact of experimentalist architecture on policymaking 
processes remains largely unclear. Without adequate analysis of experimentalist 
policymaking, our understanding is confined to the spread of experimentalist 
architecture in the EU, ultimately resulting in a poor understanding of its effects.  
Analysing experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking  
Rather than the diffusion of experimentalist architecture, this article examines its actual 
operation. To this end, it primarily focuses on a key actor in the EU, namely, the 
Commission. In the course of regulatory policymaking, the Commission may opt for 
different forms of policymaking processes, as often happens in practice. This raises the 
important research question about the conditions under which the Commission engages 
in experimentalist policymaking.    
Distinguishing between experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking  
To address this research question, experimentalist governance was contrasted with the 
more traditional hierarchical governance. Decision-making procedures and institutional 
arrangements are categorised as more or less experimentalist or hierarchical, depending 
on the extent to which their design reflects the key elements of experimentalist 
architecture, as defined by its exponents (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010). The same key 
elements are also used to distinguish between experimentalist and hierarchical forms of 
policymaking, by developing a set of indicators based upon them, but which shifts the 
emphasis from intended design to actual operation. These criteria concern both the 
policymaking process, which is narrowly defined as to what extent comparisons of 
different local approaches are taken into account and how much non-governmental 
stakeholders are consulted; and the outcome, namely, the uniformity of the adopted 
solutions and to what extent monitoring focuses on comparative review rather than 
compliance enforcement. Table 1 offers a brief overview of the criteria.  
By focusing on the fourth key element of experimentalist architecture, based on 
which goals and metrics should be revised in response to problems and solutions 
revealed by the review process, the first aspect was identified regarding how much, in 
actuality, reforms are developed on the basis of comparative implementation experience 
as evidenced, for example, by explicit references. The use of findings from comparisons 
of experiences in decision-making on reforms, crucial to experimentalist policymaking, 
departs from the conventional elaboration of reforms, typically less informed by such 
comparisons. The second issue was defined by looking at both the first and fourth key 
elements of experimentalist architecture, according to which goals should be established 
jointly by central and local units in consultation with relevant civil society stakeholders 
and then revised by a widening circle of actors. It concerns how much non-
governmental stakeholders are really involved in rulemaking and revision. Even though 
stakeholder participation does not necessarily imply that member states authorities and 
companies have the same influence on decision-making, it does mark a distinction 
between the typically more inclusive experimentalist processes and the less inclusive 
hierarchical methods.  
By reflecting upon the second key element of experimentalist architecture, 
according to which local units should be given freedom to advance general goals in 
their own way, a third indicator concerns the extent to which member states and 
regulated companies are actually granted discretion to pursue common goals through 
different approaches. The scope for local discretion, which characterizes experimentalist 
policymaking, contrasts with the obligation of member states and companies to adopt 
more uniform solutions, typical of traditional hierarchical policymaking. By giving 
consideration to the third key element of the architecture, according to which local units 
must regularly report and participate in peer reviews wherein their results are compared 
with those of others pursuing different means to the same goals, a final indicator 
concerns the degree to which different approaches adopted by member states and 
companies are compared in practice. The periodic review of comparative 
implementation experiences to promote learning distinctive of experimentalist 
policymaking differs from the monitoring characteristic of hierarchical policymaking, 
which instead primarily focuses on compliance enforcement.  
In summary, experimentalist policymaking is conceptually defined and 
empirically assessed as a process that combines a greater scope for local discretion with 
typically more inclusive rulemaking and revision based on the comparative review of 
different implementation experiences. It contrasts with traditional hierarchical 
policymaking, whereby member states and companies are obligated to adopt more 
uniform solutions that are conventionally developed less inclusively, with monitoring 
particularly focused on compliance enforcement. 
Examining scope conditions 
By building upon the scope conditions put forward in the literature, factors that might 
influence the employment of experimentalist policymaking are re-conceptualised and 
operationalised. In doing so, relative variations in these factors are allowed, which in 
turn, are key for gaining confidence or questioning arguments that emphasise their 
importance. As briefly anticipated, experimentalist theory suggests that there are two 
conditions that open up the possibility for experimentalist governance: strategic 
uncertainty and polyarchy (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010). The first jointly necessary but 
not sufficient condition, strategic uncertainty, conceptually means that neither the 
official decision-maker nor primary actors know what their precise goals should be and 
how to achieve them; hence, they conduct the joint exploration of problems and 
solutions. In the absence of strategic uncertainty, actors are convinced that they know 
how to pursue their ends, making the joint exploration of possibilities superfluous 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2012b).  
Empirically, proponents of experimentalist governance claim that strategic 
uncertainty has been rising (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012a: 176), whereas others suggest 
precisely the opposite, namely, that strategic uncertainty gradually declines as 
technically complex issues become better understood (Eberlein 2010). Yet, existing 
operationalisations either   risks conflating strategic uncertainty and experimentalist 
policymaking (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010: 9) or make assessment of strategic uncertainty 
largely arbitrary (De Burca 2010: 232). This article proposes an alternative approach 
whereby, by building upon the established study of preferences in political science and 
in line with the conceptual definition presented in the literature of strategic uncertainty 
as when policymakers ‘do not know how to achieve their declared goals’ (Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2008: 280), this concept is inversely assessed based on the specificity of key 
actors’ preferences about how to achieve policy goals. Thus, strategic uncertainty may 
be considered greater when the preferences of key actors, notably the Commission in 
this case, regarding how to achieve policy goals are more general. Conversely, it may be 
considered lower when these preferences are more specific.  
The second jointly necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of 
experimentalist governance identified in experimentalist theory is a multipolar or 
polyarchic distribution of power, in which ‘no single actor has the capacity to impose 
her own preferred solution without taking into account the views of others’ (Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2008: 280). In the absence of polyarchy, one actor is dominant, thereby 
preferring to ‘impose outcomes rather than pursue them cooperatively with others’ 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2012b: 412). Empirically, proponents of experimentalist governance 
stress the ‘firm polyarchic constraints’ characteristic of the EU (Sabel and Zeitlin 
2012a: 176), whereas others have suggested that, in fact, the polyarchic distribution of 
power or level of centralisation may significantly vary across contexts within the EU 
(Borzel 2012). This article contends that polyarchy can be understood in both de jure 
and de facto terms. Hence, it will empirically assess formal or de jure polyarchy on the 
basis of the relative constraints provided by decision-making procedures on the exercise 
of hierarchical authority. In addition, effective or de facto polyarchy will be assessed by 
examining how the relative concentration or dispersion of preferences among key policy 
actors, both public (e.g., Commission, European regulatory networks, national 
regulators) and private (e.g., incumbents and new entrants, system operators, traders) 
influence the actual capacity of some actors to impose their preferred solutions on 
others. By going beyond exclusively formalistic approaches to focus on actual 
distributions of power, this original re-conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
polyarchy also addresses common criticisms of experimentalist theory for being too 
‘apolitical’ and claims that distributive conflicts represent an unfavourable scope 
condition for experimentalist governance (Eberlein 2010).1  
Selecting cases, sources of evidence, and methods 
This article focuses on regulation, the EU’s core activity (Majone 1996), and in 
particular on energy, which is a vital sector for modern market economies and European 
market integration in which the experimentalist architecture has been ongoing for a 
significant period, and which accordingly, has been cited as a major example of 
experimentalist governance in the literature (Eberlein 2008, 2010; Sabel and Zeitlin 
2008, 2010). Yet, in the energy sector, the literature to date has only analysed 
electricity, just focusing on one issue (i.e., ‘tarification’) until the early 2000s.  
This article expands upon this empirical research by tracing and comparing 
electricity and natural gas, from the beginning of market liberalisation and integration in 
the late 1990s to the mid-2010s. It focuses on the regulation of a specific issue, namely 
the allocation and management of transport capacity for energy transmission and 
supply,2 which is at the heart of liberalisation, itself at the core of EU regulation. Since 
energy, as other ‘network industries’, needs to be transported over networks that 
represent ‘natural monopolies’ that are not economically efficient to duplicate, 
regulation to ensure non-discriminatory access to these ‘essential facilities’ is crucial 
(Baldwin et al. 2011). At the EU level, access to interconnections is a vital precondition 
for establishing a competitive internal market.  
The EU regulation of congestion management in electricity and natural gas 
offers a particularly appropriate case for studying the relationship between 
experimentalist architecture and policymaking, and in particular, the conditions under 
which the Commission engages in experimentalist policymaking. The Commission has 
discretion in choosing among different forms of policymaking, because there are no 
guidelines on when to use more experimentalist or hierarchical methods. It can engage 
in more experimentalist and hierarchical forms of policymaking under the same 
governance architecture, thanks to more experimentalist and hierarchical institutional 
arrangements and decision-making procedures that developed in parallel and almost 
identically across electricity and natural gas. Among the more hierarchical decision-
making arrangements, there is the ordinary legislative procedure, whose design does not 
greatly reflect key elements of experimentalist architecture, as defined by its proponents 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010). In particular, it does not envision obligations on national 
authorities and regulated companies to regularly report and participate in peer reviews, 
nor on a wide variety of actors to periodically contribute to rule revision. Comitology, 
which was introduced in both electricity and natural gas in the mid-2000s (European 
Parliament and Council 2003, 2005), is another more hierarchical decision-making 
procedure. This is because its institutional design does not expect the regular provision 
of information about different implementation experiences by member states and 
companies or their frequent participation in comparative peer reviews exercises. Nor 
does it explicitly mandate the periodic revision of rules by a wide circle of actors. On 
the contrary, its composition is limited to the Commission and member states 
representatives.3 This is especially true relative to the Florence Forum for electricity and 
Madrid Forum for natural gas, organized by the Commission in 1998 and 1999 
immediately after the first round of liberalisation legislation. These are more 
experimentalist institutional arrangements, because they are intended to provide ‘a 
neutral and informal framework for the discussion of issues and exchange of 
experiences’, by once or twice a year bringing together the Commission, European 
regulatory networks and agencies, national regulatory authorities and ministries, 
transmission system operators, suppliers, traders, exchanges, consumers and other 
stakeholders such as outside commercial and academic experts.4 An additional more 
experimentalist decision-making procedure is that for developing ‘network codes’, 
introduced in 2009 in both electricity and natural gas. It is more experimentalist because 
it establishes that priorities and rules be co-developed by the Commission, the EU 
regulatory agency, and the European network of system operators in consultation with 
stakeholders, and that implementation issues be raised in order to ‘elaborate upon 
solutions, taking into account stakeholders’ ideas’.5  
The evidence comes mainly from primary sources, which include policy 
documents central to the regulatory initiatives studied (e.g., minutes of meetings, 
progress reports, impact assessments, drafts for consultation and rules adopted). They 
also include semi-structured interviews with interviewees selected for their knowledge 
and expertise and who are representative of a number of dimensions (e.g., more and less 
senior representatives of both public and private bodies), which help crosscheck and 
address possible gaps emerging from publicly available documents. The data were 
analysed using a double methodology. First, the processes through which the 
Commission favours more experimentalist or hierarchical policymaking by employing 
more experimentalist or hierarchical institutional arrangements were traced. Second, the 
forms of policymaking and the conditions under which they are used were compared. 
Experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking in EU energy regulation 
Finding more experimentalist policymaking in electricity than in natural gas 
In each sector, the Commission engaged in both types of policymaking; however, 
despite the same institutional architecture, the Commission did so in varying degrees. In 
electricity, the dominant form of policymaking was experimentalist, which is more 
inclusive, leaves more scope for local discretion, and values the comparison of 
decentralised implementation experiences, which in turn, informs incremental 
rulemaking and revision. In natural gas, by contrast, policymaking was more 
hierarchical, whereby member states and regulated companies are obligated to adopt 
more uniform solutions designed by the Commission with less inclusion of stakeholders 
and monitoring is primarily focused on compliance enforcement. Table 2 gives an 
overview of the experimentalist approach pursued more in electricity than in natural 
gas. 
At the beginning of the liberalisation and integration of European energy 
markets in the late 1990s, the Commission engaged in experimentalist policymaking in 
both electricity and natural gas. The first Directives had granted member states and 
companies a large margin of discretion regarding key regulatory issues, including the 
allocation of network capacity and congestion management (European Parliament and 
Council 1996, 1998). Right after this first round of legislation in 1998 and 1999, the 
Commission created experimentalist institutional arrangements, namely the Florence 
Forum for electricity and the Madrid Forum for natural gas, which were not derived 
from the Directives or EU legal system. From their very first meetings, the Fora 
collected and discussed information about different local solutions that were being 
implemented, notably in the most experienced markets such as those of the United 
Kingdom, Nordic countries, Spain, the Netherlands and the United States (Florence 
Forum 1998a, 1998b; Madrid Forum 1999, 2000). Informed by these debates and 
comparisons, reforms were agreed upon by broad circles of actors. In 2000 and 2003, in 
electricity and natural gas respectively, the Commission, member states representatives, 
national regulatory authorities, system operators, producers, traders, exchanges and 
consumers voluntarily agreed within the Florence and Madrid Fora to non-binding 
guidelines on congestion management. These suggested the use of auctions in 
electricity, and non-secure, interruptible Use-It-Or-Lose-It (UIOLI) provisions in 
natural gas, on the grounds that these are non-discriminatory market-based approaches 
favouring market entry and competition (Florence Forum 2000; Madrid Forum 2003). 
Shortly after these agreements were reached, the Commission codified them in 
both sectors through traditional hierarchical policymaking. In 2001 and 2003, it reduced 
stakeholder participation by tabling legislative proposals for electricity and natural gas, 
respectively, through the ordinary legislative procedure (European Commission 2001, 
2003), a more hierarchical institutional arrangement than the Fora. The resulting 2003 
and 2005 Regulations obligated member states and companies to adopt more uniform 
solutions, namely those previously agreed upon experimentally. In addition, they 
required the detailed monitoring of reports, with a focus more on compliance 
enforcement than on the review of alternative local solutions (European Parliament and 
Council 2003, 2005).  
Yet, from the mid-2000s onwards, the Commission engaged in experimentalist 
policymaking more in electricity than in natural gas. In electricity, member states and 
companies had the discretion to pursue different approaches. The 2003 Regulation, 
while mandating that network congestion problems be addressed through auctions, did 
not define what specific type of auction be used, let alone through which detailed 
arrangement. In particular, it left open the choice between ‘explicit auctions’, where 
commodity and transport rights are explicitly traded through separate auctions, and 
‘implicit auctions’, where transport rights are traded implicitly while trading 
commodity, through a single auction (European Parliament and Council 2003). 
For a number of years, member states and companies’ different implementation 
experiences were compared, notably through progress reports of the European 
regulatory network, and then debated more broadly in the Florence Forum. The 
adoption of explicit auctions, for example at the Italian border with Slovenia and 
Switzerland, was juxtaposed with the use of implicit auctions in other voluntary 
regional initiatives, such as the ‘Trilateral Market Coupling’ (TMC) connecting France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the Iberian project linking Spain and Portugal, and the 
integration of continental Europe and the Nordic countries through Germany and 
Denmark. Thereafter, implementation experiences with different subtypes of implicit 
auctions were also compared and discussed, namely, ‘volume coupling’ arrangements, 
particularly used at the Danish-German border, and ‘price coupling’ arrangements, 
notably employed in the TMC (ERGEG 2007, 2008).  
Based on these comparisons, reforms were agreed upon with much stakeholder 
participation. In 2009, in the Florence Forum, a variety of actors including the 
Commission voluntarily agreed on a ‘target model’ and implementation roadmap, 
proposed by a multi-stakeholder group comprised of representatives of traders, 
generators and suppliers, exchanges, system operators and the European regulatory 
network. It suggested that congestion management be addressed through implicit rather 
than explicit auctions, based on price rather than volume coupling arrangements, to be 
progressively extended from the TMC to neighbouring regions (Florence Forum 2009). 
Then the informal agreement brokered in the Florence Forum was formalized through 
the network codes procedure, which as anticipated, involves the Commission, the EU 
agency, the European network of system operators, and stakeholders.  
In natural gas, by contrast, under the same institutional architecture, the 
Commission favoured a more hierarchical form of policymaking. Prompted by concerns 
about rising energy prices and limited consumer choice, in the mid-2000s it launched a 
sector inquiry, which concluded that existing interruptible UIOLI arrangements were 
ineffective, as incumbents often used less transport capacity than they had reserved, 
precluding potential new players from entering the market (European Commission 
2007).   
Revision of the existing rules was less informed by the comparative review of 
alternative implementation experiences and was less inclusive than in electricity. Upon 
the Commission’s request and without comparing different local approaches, the 
European regulatory network suggested that a secure UIOLI would have significantly 
enhanced competition, by bringing unused capacity back to the market on a 
contractually non-interruptible basis (ERGEG 2009a). Thus, it was recommended that 
interruptible UIOLI be replaced by firm UIOLI (ERGEG 2010), even though at the 
time, no practical experience with such a solution existed. After receiving this 
recommendation, rather than using the Madrid Forum and the network codes procedure, 
the Commission directly proposed its adoption to the relevant comitology committee, in 
which participation is limited to itself and member states representatives. During the 
comitology process, rule revision was less focused on comparing different 
implementation experiences than on ensuring that no vital interests of member states be 
threatened.6 Rather than leaving room for local discretion, the resulting 2012 Decision 
obligated member states and companies to adopt more uniform solutions. Specifically, it 
mandated the compulsory application, from 2016 onwards, of firm, non-interruptible 
UIOLI at pipelines facing congestion above certain levels (European Commission 
2012a). Furthermore, it also introduced monitoring provisions focused more on 
compliance enforcement than on the comparative review of alternative local solutions, 
by requiring the EU regulatory agency to produce annual monitoring reports verifying 
compliance with the adopted uniform solution (European Commission 2012a).   
Accounting for the forms of policymaking found 
From a perspective that emphasises the importance of de jure polyarchy, it is hard to 
explain why, between the late 1990s and the early 2000s in both electricity and natural 
gas, the Commission engaged in both experimentalist and hierarchical forms of 
policymaking, even though the formal distribution of powers had not changed. Equally, 
it is hard to understand why, from the mid-2000s onwards, the Commission engaged in 
experimentalist policymaking more in electricity than in natural gas, even though de 
jure polyarchy did not vary across the two sectors, in which the Commission was 
equipped with equivalent comitology powers at similar times (European Parliament and 
Council 2003, 2005).  
The similarities and variations in forms of policymaking found are instead, 
consistent with strategic uncertainty. In the late 1990s, in both electricity and natural 
gas, the liberalisation of national markets was a very new policy area with little 
experience to draw upon, while the integration of such national markets was entirely 
virgin territory (Eberlein 2008, 2010). At the time, cross-border transactions were 
modest and informally negotiated within a framework of technical cooperation among 
neighbouring system operators, focusing more on system security than on commercial 
objectives. A new level of coordination had to be established (European Commission 
1999). Yet key actors, including the Commission, only had general preferences for non-
discriminatory congestion management procedures (European Parliament and Council 
1996, 1998; Florence Forum 1998a, 1998b; Madrid Forum 1999, 2000). Under these 
conditions of greater strategic uncertainty, as seen in the late 1990s, the Commission 
favoured more experimentalist policymaking in both electricity and natural gas. 
Thereafter, in the early 2000s, it opted for more traditional hierarchical 
policymaking in both sectors. It did so shortly after it had developed more specific 
policy preferences, namely for auctions in electricity and interruptible UIOLI in natural 
gas, as evidenced by the guidelines on congestion management that it voluntarily agreed 
upon in the Florence (2000) and Madrid Fora (2003). That is, more hierarchical 
policymaking was favoured under conditions of lower strategic uncertainty.  
Then, as observed from the mid-2000s onwards, policymaking was more 
experimentalist in electricity than in natural gas. In electricity, the 2003 Regulation 
established that market-based auctions be used, but did not express a preference for 
either explicit or implicit auctions, let alone for specific arrangements to implement 
them (European Parliament and Council 2003). Nor did the Commission indicate any 
such preference (2004, 2005). Proposals and reports conducted upon invitation of the 
Commission rapidly identified implicit auctions, then implemented only in the 
integrated Scandinavian ‘Nord Pool’, as the theoretically ideal solution. But questioned 
their practical feasibility in continental Europe, organised instead in several national 
markets managed by a number of electricity exchanges (Consentec and Frontier 
Economics 2004; ETSO and EuroPEX 2004). Neither the Commission nor other actors 
knew whether, in actuality, this approach could be adopted in continental Europe and, if 
so, how.7 
It was only in 2007 that the Commission expressed a specific preference, 
namely, for implicit rather than explicit auctions (2007). This only happened after the 
implementation of practical experiences was compared and debated. Among various 
voluntary regional experiences, it was especially important the TMC project connecting 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, which since 2006 demonstrated that it is actually 
possible to apply implicit auctions to continental Europe even in the absence of a single 
European electricity exchange (ERGEG 2007, 2008). Still, when the Commission had 
developed precise preferences for implicit auctions, it had not also developed specific 
preferences for the detailed arrangements to implement them (2007). Instead, it was 
only in 2009 that the Commission, together with other actors, developed more specific 
preferences in this regard, namely for price rather than volume coupling arrangements 
(Florence Forum 2009). This only happened after, through extensive comparisons and 
deliberation among a broad range of actors, the volume coupling alternative came to be 
considered less efficient and predictable, especially because in the Danish-German 
implementation experience it had failed to launch twice and had delivered economically 
incoherent results.8 However until then, many believed that this was a feasible 
alternative.9 In contrast, by particularly reflecting on the TMC project, a variety of 
private and public actors including the Commission concluded that price coupling had 
proven its ability to operate efficiently (Florence Forum 2009).  
In simplified terms, the reform essentially entailed the adaptation of the Nordic 
model to continental Europe, including the application of such a model in the absence of 
a central European electricity exchange. But in practice, this proved to be so 
complicated that the Commission could not have conceived it on its own and imposed it 
hierarchically. Instead, it required experimentalist policymaking, in which the 
Commission acted as the main convener of a process whereby rule revision was agreed 
on the basis of the comparative review of alternative implementation experiences and 
the TMC project represented ‘the’ experiment.10 
While in electricity, the Commission and other actors were exposed to policy 
questions about which they did not have precise preferences, namely what type of 
auctions should be used and through which detailed arrangements; in natural gas they 
could rely on more precise preferences for specific solutions, namely UIOLI provisions. 
In contrast to electricity, in natural gas the Commission had a very clear idea of both its 
goal and how to achieve it, namely, releasing transport capacity through more effective 
UIOLI.11 More precisely, the Commission had a clear preference for contractually 
secure rather than interruptible UIOLI provisions.12 Already in the conclusions of the 
sector inquiry that prompted revision of the existing rules, the Commission ‘highlighted 
the importance of enhancing the scope for entry through […] strict application of use-it-
or-lose-it provisions’ (2007: 327). The same preference was shared by the 
Commission’s formal advisory body, which upon invitation of the Commission and 
despite the absence of any practical implementation experience, recommended the 
replacement of interruptible with firm UIOLI (2009a, 2010). Thereafter, this position 
was reaffirmed in an impact assessment, in which the Commission reiterated its belief 
that secure UIOLI represents a very effective tool for creating a ‘level playing field’ 
between incumbents and new entrants (2012b).  
Backed by certainty about its preferred solution and thus under conditions of 
lower strategic uncertainty, as seen, rather than employing more experimentalist 
institutional arrangements such as the Madrid Forum and the network codes procedure, 
the Commission directly put forward a proposal to the relevant comitology committee. 
This resulted in a Decision, which at its core, obligates member states and companies to 
apply more uniform solutions and requires the EU regulatory agency to monitor 
compliance with them (European Commission 2012a). As recognized by the 
Commission’s advisory body itself, the aim was to ‘rapidly adopt new provisions 
allowing to reduce congestion’ (ERGEG 2009a: 2). Indeed, the Commission sought a 
‘quick win’ and confident about its preferred solution, chose to use a faster and less 
inclusive, more hierarchical decision-making procedure.13  
Nevertheless, an exclusive focus on strategic uncertainty to the neglect of the 
more political dimension would be detrimental. Indeed, considering also the role of de 
facto polyarchy provides a fuller understanding. There is no evidence suggesting that, 
from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the relative concentration or dispersion of 
preferences among key public and private actors was different across electricity and 
natural gas. However, both publicly available documents and interviews suggest that, 
from the mid-2000s onwards, such preferences were less concentrated in electricity than 
in natural gas. To be sure, in electricity the Commission could count on the industry, 
which was a driving force behind the rulemaking process. However, generators and 
suppliers were often even more active and supportive than national regulators 
themselves;14  national electricity exchanges strenuously resisted the creation of a single 
European exchange, which would have threatened their very existence;15 while traders 
did not support the transition to implicit auctions, which do not allow arbitraging, 
traders’ key business.16 On the whole, then, in electricity there was not only more 
strategic uncertainty, but also more de facto polyarchy in terms of coalitional alignment 
of actors.  
In natural gas, incumbents strongly resisted the reform process (ERGEG 2009b). 
But in contrast to electricity, in natural gas the Commission was supported by 
regulators, both the European network and national authorities, especially the German 
and Austrian ones, which were convinced that stricter UIOLI provisions were indeed 
needed.17 This led the Commission, with the support of key national regulators, to 
impose its own less uncertain preferences on the recalcitrant industry actors.  
Conclusions 
By engaging with an innovative, experimentalist interpretation of EU policymaking and 
using energy regulation as case study, this article found that the same architecture can 
be used more or less experimentally or hierarchically, depending upon strategic 
uncertainty and de facto polyarchy. Through in-depth comparative analysis of EU 
regulation of a crucial issue (i.e., congestion management) in electricity and natural gas 
over the past two decades, it advances empirical research on EU energy regulation.  
It also contributes to the experimentalist governance and EU policymaking 
literatures. By introducing a distinction between governance architectures and 
policymaking and defining the former as institutional arrangements and decision-
making procedures and the latter as how decision-making actually occurs within such 
architectures, the main premise of this article already offered a first conceptual 
innovation relative to the existing literature, which thus far has focused on documenting 
the diffusion of experimentalist architectures without differentiating between them and 
their operation (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010). A second, related methodological 
innovation is the development and use of an original set of indicators to more clearly 
distinguish more experimentalist or hierarchical decision-making procedures from 
policymaking processes. Since these criteria are widely applicable, they might be 
directly useful in future research studies Furthermore, by contending that polyarchy can 
be understood in both de jure and de facto terms and  allowing for possible variations in 
both, this article showed that polyarchy is not fixed (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012a), but might 
in fact vary (Borzel 2012). Equally, by proposing an alternative operationalisation based 
on the specificity of key actors’ preferences, it showed that strategic uncertainty is 
neither consistently rising (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012a) nor gradually declining (Eberlein 
2010), but rather, varies cyclically. Of course, the generalisability of these findings 
should not be overstated, but should instead be tested, also exploring what role strategic 
uncertainty might play in the determination of actors’ preferences. In addition, by 
finding forms of policymaking that are not based on formal or de jure polyarchy, but are 
instead consistent with strategic uncertainty and effective or de facto polyarchy, this 
article refines existing claims (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010), suggesting that strategic 
uncertainty, with de facto rather than de jure polyarchy, might be jointly sufficient for 
experimentalist policymaking. Once again, one should be cautious about the external 
validity of these inductive arguments, which should be tested. Also, instead of a linear 
trend in which hierarchical governance re-emerges and experimentalist governance 
loses relative importance as strategic uncertainty gradually declines and distributive 
conflicts resurface (Eberlein 2010), this article found cyclical variation. Nonetheless, 
the interactions between these forms of governance deserve attention beyond temporal 
alternation, both in their simultaneous operation (Eberlein 2010) and in their trajectories 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2010). Moreover, since policymaking might not necessarily be 
confined to experimentalist and hierarchical forms (Borzel 2012), future research might 
also widen the two-dimensional approach adopted here. 
More broadly, this article not only reinforces the message that, in contrast to 
conventional practice in which institutional characteristics are often considered the 
determinants of policy outcomes and already known institutional variables are 
eventually used as explanatory factors due to lack of information on policy-level 
variables (Radaelli et al. 2012), scholars need to look beyond institutional design to the 
ways in which decision-making actually occurs. It also challenges mono-causal 
explanations that put exclusive emphasis on either political considerations (Kelemen 
and Tarrant 2011; Tarrant and Kelemen 2017) or functional needs. Instead, it supports 
more nuanced perspectives that interpret political and functional accounts as not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, extending such perspectives from questions of choice 
and design of bureaucratic structures (Blauberger and Rittberger 2015, 2017) to their 
actual operation. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 While there has been significant debate about whether experimentalist governance 
requires a shadow of hierarchy or penalty defaults, both accounts concern the 
‘effectiveness’ of experimentalist governance due to greater or lesser willingness of 
non-state actors to cooperate. Since neither of these accounts makes any prediction 
about the article’s question, which instead concerns the likeliness of public actors to 
more or less adopt experimentalist methods, these factors were not considered. 
2 For reasons of tractability, this article focuses on the energy markets’ timeframe commonly 
considered most important, namely, ‘day-ahead’.    
3 Certainly, no assumption is made about how comitology operates in practice. The 
point here is merely that comitology, in its design, does not greatly reflect key elements 
of experimentalist architecture. 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/meeting-european-electricity-regulatory-forum-florence; 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/madrid-forum (accessed March 2016). 
5 http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/European-
Stakeholder-Committees.aspx; http://www.entsog.eu/publications/joint-functionality-
process#1-FIRST-FUNCTIONALITY-CYCLE-FROM-2014 (accessed September 
2016).   
6 Interviews with Dr Matti Supponen, Policy Coordinator at the European Commission 
Directorate-General for Energy. Brussels, 19 May 2016; Edith Hofer, Assistant to the 
Director General for Energy at the European Commission. Brussels, 19 May 2016; 
Marco Foresti, Advisor at ENTSO-E. Brussels, 18 May 2016.   
7 Interview with Dr. Juan Jose Alba Rios, Chairman of Eurelectric and Vice President of 
Endesa. Brussels, 17 May 2016. 
8 Interview with Peter Styles, Chairman of EFET. London, 28 July 2016. 
9 Interview with Alberto Pototschnig, Director of ACER. Ljubljana, 9 June 2016. 
10 Interview with Dr. Matti Supponen. 
                                                                                                                                               
11 Interview with Stephen Rose, Chairman at and Head at RWE. London, 25 May 2016. 
12 Interview with Dr. Margot Loudon, Deputy Secretary General of Eurogas. Brussels, 
18 May 2016. 
13 Interview with Stephen Rose. 
14 Interviews with Dr. Juan Jose Alba Rios; Alberto Pototschnig; Edith Hofer.  
15 Interviews with Dr. Guido Cervigni, Head of the Italian power exchange. Email, 7 
April 2015; Dr. Juan Jose Alba Rios. 
16 Interviews with Alberto Pototschnig; Dr. Martin Povh, Officer at ACER. Ljubljana, 9 
June 2016. 
17 Interviews with Dr. Annegret Groebel, Vice President of CEER and Head at German 
regulatory authority. Telephone, 10 June 2016; Csilla Bartok, Team Leader at ACER. 
Ljubljana, 9 June 2016; Thomas Hoelzer, Officer at ACER. Ljubljana, 9 June 2016. 
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Table 1. Distinguishing between experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking. 
Indicators  Experimentalist 
policymaking 
Hierarchical 
policymaking 
How far rule-making and revision is informed by 
comparative implementation experience 
More Less 
How much non-governmental stakeholders are 
consulted 
More Less 
How much scope for local discretion is granted  More Less 
To what extent monitoring focuses on comparative 
review rather than compliance enforcement  
More Less 
 
Table 2. Experimentalist and hierarchical policymaking in EU energy regulation. 
 Electricity Natural gas 
How much rulemaking and revision were informed by 
comparative implementation experiences 
More Less 
How much non-governmental stakeholders were 
consulted 
More Less 
How much scope for local discretion was granted More Less 
To what extent monitoring focused on comparative 
review rather than compliance enforcement 
More Less 
Policymaking  More 
experimentalist 
More 
hierarchical 
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